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Abstract
The Madrid–Barcelona air route constitutes one of the main aerial routes in the 
European corridor in terms of traﬃc demand (4.2 million passengers in 2003). To deal 
with such a high demand, three airline companies (Iberia, Air Europa, and Span Air) 
globally oﬀer more than 60 ﬂights per day either way.
Currently, the construction of a high-speed railway line between the two cities is 
under way. The line is expected to come into commercial service by 2007, covering 
the whole of the 625 km between the cities. 
This article analyzes the impact that high-speed railway services have on air traf-
ﬁc demand. The results are then compared with real data corresponding to the 
Paris–London line, on the occasion of the launch of the commercial service of the 
high-speed Eurostar train.
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Introduction
In the past decade (1990–2000) the demand for air transport in Spain has 
increased signiﬁcantly. A thorough examination of the changes in air traﬃc in 
the Madrid–Barcelona route, one with the greatest demand within the Iberian 
peninsula, is a suﬃcient indicator of this growth. In fact, in 1990 the ﬂow of air 
passengers between the two cities was 2 million persons, while last year, this ﬁgure 
reached 4.2 million passengers—an average annual growth of 6.4 percent.
Internationally, the above-mentioned ﬁgures place Spain in the vanguard of Euro-
pean air sectors with the greatest air traﬃc demand (Table 1).
 Table 1. Main Passenger Air Trafﬁc Routes Within the Main  
European Countries (2001)
     
   Passenger Air Traﬃc
 Country Route (in millions) 
 Germany Frankfurt–Berlin 1.6
  Frankfurt–Munich 1.5
 Spain Madrid–Barcelona 4.0
  Barcelona–Palma de Mallorca 1.6
 France Paris–Nice 3.0
  Paris–Toulouse 2.9
 Great Britain London–Glasgow 2.7
  London–Edinburgh 2.6
 Italy Rome –Milan 3.4
Source: Original chart using data from the Institute of Air Transport (ITA).
The Madrid–Barcelona sector was opened to air transport liberalization in 1993. 
Since then, two new companies, Air Europa and Span Air, have oﬀered services 
along with Iberia, the only operating airline in this route before 1993. The increase 
in the number of services has given rise to two important factors: (1) a signiﬁcant 
increase in mobility in this corridor and (2) an overwhelming alteration in the 
modal distribution of air traﬃc among the three companies.
On the other hand, a new railway high-speed line is presently under construction, 
which, by 2005, will connect Madrid and Barcelona in two and a half hours.
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This article explores the eﬀect of air transport liberalization and the foreseen 
consequences not only by air companies that operate in this corridor, but also by 
the new railway operator (RENFE), in the modiﬁcation of the present distribution 
between modes of transportation demand.
The Madrid–Barcelona Air Corridor (1974–1993)
The main commercial routes that have existed for more than 25 years between the 
two cities can be summarized by the following data: at the beginning of the 1970s, 
air traﬃc through this corridor was approximately 900,000 passengers per year. 
This traﬃc included 78 percent businesspeople who wanted to take a round-trip 
on the same day.
To meet this demand, in November 1974 Iberia introduced its shuttle service, the 
ﬁrst such service operating in Europe. This service encompassed the Anglo-Saxon 
concept of “ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served.” The ﬁrst air shuttle of this kind operated 
between Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (1959), followed by a similar service estab-
lished shortly thereafter between New York and Washington, D.C. (1961).
For almost 20 years, Iberia was the only airline operating the Madrid–Barcelona 
connection. In terms of supply, 13 ﬂights per day in either direction were oﬀered in 
1974, while 30 ﬂights per day were oﬀered in 1993. Figure 1 shows that passenger 
traﬃc grew from 974,000 the ﬁrst year the air shuttle service operated (1974) to 
1,926,000 passengers in 1993. It is easy to see the inﬂuence of the economy on the 
development of air traﬃc over time. In the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, air service was 
aﬀected by a serious economic crisis in Spain. While the year 1991 was especially 
diﬃcult because of the Gulf War, air service partially recovered due to the Olym-
pics, which were held in Barcelona the following year (1992). In short, air traﬃc on 
the Madrid–Barcelona route doubled during the period 1974–1993.
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Figure 1. Evolution of Air Trafﬁc on the Madrid–Barcelona Route  
(1974–1993)
Arrival of New Companies in the Madrid–Barcelona Air Shuttle
The opening of the airline market in Europe began to take eﬀect at the end of the 
1980s, and it came into being for the domestic market as of January 1993. For the 
Madrid–Barcelona corridor, this was characterized by the introduction of a new 
range of ﬂights provided by two airlines that, until that time, had not operated 
in this sector: the ﬁrst, Air Europa, began services on January 31, 1994, and the 
second, Span Air, on March 14, 1994. Table 2 shows the ﬂights initially oﬀered by 
each airline.
An analysis of Table 2 shows the following signiﬁcant features:
• Frequency of service oﬀered by Iberia was notably higher than that oﬀered by 
the other two companies. Speciﬁcally, out of a weekly total (the number of 
ﬂights on Saturdays and Sundays decreases for any company) of 603 ﬂights, 
Iberia oﬀered 430 ﬂights (71%); Air Europa, 102 ﬂights (14%); and Span Air, 
71 ﬂights (12%).
• Unlike Iberia, Air Europa and Span Air obligated passengers to reserve a 
seat on a given ﬂight (despite the fact that the ﬂight initially chosen could 
be changed under certain conditions).
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• Prior to the arrival of the two new companies, Iberia had a single fare of 90 
euros for tourist class. Upon their addition, Air Europa and Span Air oﬀered 
fares that were 33 percent lower than the existing ones, with normal fares 
of around 60 euros.
Table 2. Services Provided in the Madrid–Barcelona Air Shuttle (1994)
      
  Frequency of Type of Price Level (€) Fare
 Airline Service Fare (one way) Conditions
 Iberia every 15 min. Business 114 No reservation 
  on the hour   needed
  every 30  Flexible  90 No reservation
  to 60 min.  economy rate  needed
  during 
  nonpeak  Low-hour 72 9am to 4pm
  hours economy rate  8pm to 10pm
  regularly Reduced 58 Reservation
  scheduled price  needed   
  ﬂights
 Air Every 2 hrs Regular 60 Reservation
 Europa  economy fare  required
   Reduced 54 Bought in a
   economy fare  booklet of  
     
20 ﬂights
 Span Every 2-3 hrs Business 77 Reservation
 Air    required
   Regular 60 Reservation
   economy fare  Required
   Economy fare 51 Buying the 
   (round trip)  round-trip
     
ticket at the
     
same time
€ = Euros
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With regard to the demand for air traﬃc, Table 3a shows the changes experienced 
by each airline. Note how the arrival of the new companies on the Madrid–Barce-
lona air shuttle route led to an increase in air traﬃc by almost one million passen-
gers in its ﬁrst year of operation (1994) compared to the previous year (1993).
In terms of market share, in 1994 Air Europa and Span Air each captured 15 per-
cent of the total passenger traﬃc, with Iberia’s share decreasing from 100 to 70 
percent. Since then, Span Air has progressed the most, achieving a market share 
of more than 21 percent in 2002. Subsequently, Iberia’s market share was 64.5 
percent, and Air Europa’s was 14.1 percent.
As shown in Table 3a, Iberia’s market share has decreased by 35.5 percent since 
the arrival of the other airlines in the Madrid–Barcelona route. The impact of Air 
Europa and Span Air was an overall increase of 30 percent, and in the past eight 
years both companies (but especially the latter) have captured 5 percent more of 
the market share.
After examining Table 3a, it is worth exploring why Span Air has experienced such 
strong growth, especially in the past two years. The reasons include:
1. Ever since its entry into the sector in 1994, Span Air has increased its num-
ber of ﬂights per day in either direction, beginning with 7 to 16 currently. 
In contrast, Air Europa has maintained virtually the same number of ﬂights 
(9 and 10 ﬂights per day in 1994 and 2002, respectively).
2. In a survey of passengers conducted in 1995, Span Air was the most highly 
rated airline with respect to treatment by land and ﬂight personnel, in-ﬂight 
service, ease of boarding, seat comfort, and comfort and cleanliness on 
board. Seven years later, passenger ratings remain the same.
3. Span Air is considered one of the most punctual European airlines (rated 
number one in 2002). In addition, in February 2001 it added a commitment 
to punctuality by promising passengers a free ticket for any delay of more 
than 15 minutes in the airline’s departure from Madrid or Barcelona.
4. In terms of fare levels, Span Air continues to provide the most competitively 
priced transport services compared to the other companies (see Table 
3b).
Depending on the time of the ﬂight, fare levels oﬀered by Span Air even in business 
class are at times up to 60 percent less than those of Iberia (Table 3b). Fare diﬀer-
ences between the two companies are also signiﬁcant in economy class.
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* Million passengers
Source: A. López Pita using data from Iberia, Air Europa, and Span Air.
Table 3b. Airfare Levels on the Madrid–Barcelona Route (2002)
Iberia’s main attraction continues to be its frequency of ﬂights, with 47 per day 
in either direction; that is, it has three times as many ﬂights as Span Air. These 
diﬀerences are more pronounced during nonpeak hours and less so during peak 
hours.
Madrid–Barcelona Corridor Supply and Demand
The two largest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona, form metropolitan areas of 
more than 5 and 3 million inhabitants, respectively. From a demographic point 
of view, the cities located along the corridor linking Madrid and Barcelona are 
Zaragoza (700,000 inhabitants), Lleida (120,000 inhabitants), and Tarragona/Reus 
(200,000 inhabitants) (Figure 2).
Table 3a. Passenger Air Trafﬁc and Market Share by Airline on the  
Madrid–Barcelona Route (1993–2003)
€ = Euros
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005
24
Among the transport services oﬀered to people traveling between Madrid and 
Barcelona are:
• a highway infrastructure as far as Zaragoza (325 km) and a freeway from 
there to Barcelona (296km)
• a railway line (692 km) between Madrid and Barcelona, which is 71 km 
further than the distance by road and 212 km more than that by air
• air service provided by three companies between Madrid and Barcelona
Travel times oﬀered by each mode of transport, average service frequency, and 
fare levels are given in Table 4. The response of demand to the services oﬀered by 
each mode is air, 64 percent; private vehicle, 23 percent; railway, 8 percent; and 
coach, 5 percent.
Figure 2. The Madrid–Barcelona Corridor
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Table 4. Madrid–Barcelona Passenger Transport Services (2002)
      
This supply–demand analysis shows that railways play a very insigniﬁcant role in 
passenger services between Madrid and Barcelona. It is important to note that 
the existing rail line between the two cities, built in the 19th century, imposes a 
constraint on the commercial speed to about 106 km/h and does not permit the 
journey times of even the fastest trains (6h 30min) to be reduced.
Construction of a New Rail Line  
Between Madrid and Barcelona at 350 km/h
As discussed above, the existing Madrid–Barcelona line oﬀers low-quality service, 
especially with regard to the commercial speed achieved between the two cities 
(for European standards)—100 km/hr. It also comprises only about 8 percent of 
the distribution among all the services. Improvement of this service is not possible 
due to the current state of the railway lines which provide a limited turning radius 
in terms of railway track geometry (300 to 700 m).
Diﬃculties on the rail route between Madrid and Barcelona, the commercial suc-
cess achieved with high-speed lines operating between Madrid and Seville with 
standard gauge, and existing congestion problems at airports in both cities led the 
Spanish government to plan a new line between the country’s two most impor-
tant cities.
With respect to air traﬃc, it is important to remember that the volume of passen-
gers at Madrid airport increased from 15 million in 1991 to 34 million in 2001,  an 
average annual accumulative growth of 8.5 percent. Meanwhile, passenger traﬃc 
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at Barcelona airport in the same period increased from 9 million to 20 million, 
averaging similar annual growth to that of the Madrid airport. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the percentage of ﬂights delayed by more than 15 minutes at both 
airports is almost 50 percent, with an average delay per ﬂight of around 50 min-
utes.
Based on these data, the new line project between Madrid and Barcelona (stan-
dard gauge) will provide a railway service that is very attractive to habitual shuttle 
passengers. In particular, origin/destination traveling times of two and a half hours 
are projected.
Looking toward the future, what scenarios can be forecast for this corridor?
Foreseeable Future Scenario
An analysis of the impact of high-speed railway services on air transport demand 
in Europe has been the subject of many studies in the past few decades. Thus, the 
curve shown in Figure 3 emphasizes rail’s market share compared to that of the 
airlines, according to how long the trip takes by land transport.
Figure 3. Effect of Train Journey Time on the  
Proportion of Air and Rail Travelers 
 Source: UIC (International Union of Railways).
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Based on this curve shown in Figure 3, and more speciﬁcally from the experi-
ences on the Madrid–Seville high-speed line (Table 5), it would be tempting to 
extrapolate the same conclusions about the operation of the new high-speed 
Madrid–Barcelona line.
Table 5. Railway Market Share Compared to Airline Market Share on 
Madrid—Seville Route
Source: RENFE and Iberia.
The distribution by means of transport on the Madrid–Seville route corresponds 
to a railway travel time between the two cities of two and a half hours, precisely the 
same amount of time forecast for the Madrid–Barcelona route. Thus, we could ini-
tially estimate that the high-speed railway on the Madrid–Barcelona route could 
also have a market share of more than 80 percent compared to the airlines.
An evaluation of what the potential market share might be has been carried out 
using the forecasting models that are usually applied in Europe. The need for a 
more precise estimate essentially comes from the existence of two important ele-
ments that diﬀerentiate this line from the Madrid–Seville sector:
1. diﬀerent attributes of the competition between diﬀerent means of transport 
in both corridors, as seen in Figure 4, and
2. foreseeable generation of less traﬃc on the Madrid–Barcelona route since 
it is primarily a commercial route.
On the other hand, it is important to take into account that present air services 
between Madrid and Barcelona are noticeably diﬀerent from that existing in 
other sectors where a high-speed line was also built (Figure 4). Consequently, 
for this Spanish scenario, the average waiting time between two ﬂights is only 20 
minutes
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Demand for railway transport has been estimated based on the use of the price-
time model to determine the distribution between the two means of transport 
and based on a gravitational model for the evaluation of the traﬃc generated.
The price-time model provides a means of calculating the share of traﬃc of the dif-
ferent modes as a fraction of the total traﬃc. The model elaborated between 1967 
and 1973 by C. Abraham and J. D. Blanchet is based on the assumption that pas-
sengers choose between two diﬀerent modes in relation to the value they attach 
to time, cost, and journey time features of each of the modes. Thus, the user selects 
the mode with the lowest generalized cost in relation to this value of time.
Time value represents the price (in dollars per hour) a traveler agrees to spare one 
hour of his or her journey. The higher the number, the more the time is valorised 
and, therefore, the more inclined the traveler will be to use the fastest transpor-
tation mode, irrespective of the price. On the other hand, a traveler whose time 
value is low will consider the price criteria before the speed criteria.
Figure 4. Scenario of Competition Between Means of Transport on the 
Madrid–Seville and Madrid–Barcelona Routes
Source: A. López-Pita (2001).
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Analytically, generalized costs for traveler j of two modes are:
Mode 1 Cg
1
 = P
1
 + h
j
 T
1
Mode 2 Cg
1
 = P
2
 + h
j
 T
2
where:
P
i
 is the price of the journey including access/egress cost
T
i
 indicates total trip time (travel time from A to B with mode i; access/time 
from A with mode i (air to rail) to the airport or the station, including 
terminal time; egress time from B with mode i (air or rail) from the airport 
or the station; time of waiting between two ﬂights 
Cg
i
  equals generalized cost (expressed in dollars)
h
j
 is time value
Figure 5 shows the choice between air–auto–high-speed rail according to the 
respective generalized costs.
Figure 5. Price–Time Model
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Passenger traﬃc estimates between Madrid and Barcelona were based on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
• Auto: Fare level similar to the current level ($74.5, petrol and freeway toll)
• Airplane: Fare level similar to the current level (average price equivalent to 
$90 by passenger
• Railway: Fare level similar to the Madrid–Seville line (average price equivalent 
to $0.12 (Vkm) 
• Value of travel time in 2002 ($)
Mobility Auto Airplane High-Speed Railway
Obligatory 14 40 30
Non-Obligatory 12 24 19
The gravity model or induced-demand model is designed to forecast the total 
amount of induced traﬃc for each of the diﬀerent modes. Gravity models are 
single-mode in the sense that they apply only to the mode of transport whose 
traﬃc generation is to be estimated. The induced traﬃc is proportional to the 
variation in the generalized cost, and is highly dependent on the services oﬀered 
by the new high-speed rail mode in terms of travel time, fares, frequency, comfort, 
and accessibility to stations.
Analytically,
where:
T
ij
  is the traﬃc between zone i and zone j
P
0pi
 and P
0pj
 are the population of zones i and j
W
i
 and W
j
 indicate the income per capita of zones i and j
C
gij
  represents the generalized cost of transport between zone i and  
  zone j
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α  is the elasticity of traﬃc to the population;
β  is the elasticity of traﬃc to the income per capita;
γ  denotes the elasticity of traﬃc demand to the generalized cost 
  of transport; and
K  is a constant term.
Following a change in the services oﬀered, the variation in traﬃc ∆T is linked to 
the variation in the generalized cost ∆Cg by means of the formula:
The analysis undertaken in the diﬀerent Spanish sectors allows us to make the 
following conclusions:
1. The elasticity of population is close to the unity (∝ ≈ 1).
2. The elasticity of the income per capita is close to 0.9 (β ≈ 0.9).
3. The elasticity of traﬃc demand to the generalized cost of transport is 1.6 
for nonbusiness trips and 1.9 for business trips.
The following results have been obtained based on the preceding hypotheses:
• Air traﬃc captured by the high-speed railway 2.20 M travelers
• Highway traﬃc capture    0.36 M travelers
• Traﬃc on conventional railway lines captured 0.57 M travelers
• Traﬃc generated     0.35 M travelers
• Total       3.48 M  travelers
 
Thus, the railway will transport 3.48 million travelers, compared to 2 million travel-
ers by airplane (4.2 – 2.2 Mt), giving rise to a distribution for the means of trans-
port as 64 percent (railway) and 36 percent (airplane).
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005
32
On the other hand, the forecasts generated by Iberia claim that start-up of the 
high-speed railway line will mean a loss of 38 percent in all air traﬃc on the 
Madrid–Barcelona route compared to current level of traﬃc (4.2 million travel-
ers).
According to the Iberia forecast, distribution between the airplane-railway sys-
tems would be as follows:
• Airplane 2.60 M travelers (54.5%)
• High-speed railway 2.17 M travelers (45.5%)
  - Captured from air transport 1.60   M travelers
  - Captured from conventional railways 0.57  M travelers
Without taking into account the traﬃc that rail will capture from highway and 
the traﬃc generated by the railway itself, airplane traﬃc will have a market share 
of 54.5 percent with respect to the railway. The inclusion of the two above-men-
tioned means of transport, which are not considered by Iberia (highway 0.36 Mt 
and newly generated traﬃc 0.35 Mt), would thus invert the preponderance of air 
traﬃc—railway (2.88 Mt) and airplane (2.6 Mt)—giving rise to a distribution for 
the various means of transport as 52.5 percent and 47.5 percent, respectively. The 
results are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Forecast of Evolution of Rail–Plane Travelers Modal Distribution  
in Relation to Madrid-Barcelona with New High-Speed Line
 Mode At Present 
Forecast with New High-Speed Line
   Author’s Estimate Iberia
 Railway 11% 63.5% 52.5%
 Plane 89% 36.5% 47.5%
In conclusion, in the initial stages, it seems reasonable to predict that, given the dif-
ferences in the existing supply between the Madrid–Seville and Madrid–Barcelona 
routes, the high-speed railway will not—at least initially—reach a market share 
of 80 percent with respect to air travel. This is a value that might be estimated 
from the existing European experience (Figure 3) and particularly from the results 
obtained for the high-speed line between Madrid and Seville. Therefore, we can 
expect that the impact of the high-speed line between Madrid and Barcelona, 
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where a high density of air services already exists, will not be as high as the rest of 
the high-speed lines in commercial services across Europe today.
At this time, it is not possible to predict to what degree the decrease in air traf-
ﬁc will aﬀect each of the companies currently operating between Madrid and 
Barcelona. However, it is reasonable to believe that both Air Europa and Span Air 
will withdraw their services, especially the former, leaving Iberia as the sole airline 
operating this route.
The results of our analysis with regard to the distribution of the high-speed railway 
services (64%) can be compared to a real-life instance of the Paris–London line. 
In eﬀect, currently the Eurostar takes 2 hours, 35minutes to complete the route 
and dictates about 65 percent of the market, compared to 35 percent by air trans-
port services. Air transport between London and Paris (2.8 million passengers in 
2003) is one of the highest in Europe. Nowadays, there are more than 90 ﬂights per 
day in either direction between the two cities.
With the high-speed railway services, the percentage of the market using private 
vehicles currently represents about 16 percent of the total passengers.
Conclusions
The Madrid–Barcelona route constitutes one of the most heavily-used air routes 
by passengers in Europe. From 1974 until 1993, there was continuous ﬂight service 
(air shuttle) which went from transporting 0.9 million passengers to almost 2 mil-
lion passengers with a single operating airline—Iberia.
The process of liberalizing air transport in 1994 made it possible for two new com-
panies, Air Europa and Span Air, to oﬀer services along the same route. Their entry 
into the market generated additional air traﬃc of almost 1 million passengers in 
the ﬁrst year. With each of them attracting almost 15 percent of the market share, 
these companies reduced Iberia’s share to 70 percent. 2001 and 2002, Span Air’s 
market share increased considerably, reaching its current share of 21 percent com-
pared to Iberia’s share of 64 percent in the same market.
Within the next two years, the entry into commercial service of a high-speed 
railway line between Madrid and Barcelona will likely cause an alteration in the 
transport market. Forecasts predict that the railway line will have a market share 
of around 53 to 63 percent (compared to its current 11%), thus reducing the air-
lines’ current market share of 89 to 36 to 47 percent.
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